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BEYOND INDICATIVE PLANNING 
Stuart Holland */ 
In the paradigm of Friedrich von Hayek, plan is very much a four-
letter word. He polarises the distinction between plan and market and 
assumes that the persuit of any form of planning in a modern capitalist 
economy will lead directly to the Gulag Archipelago and the suspension 
of democratic liberties. 
This argument was rejected by several European economies, as well 
as Japan, for most of the period following the Second iforld War. It was 
rejected less on theoretical or ideological grounds than in term of the 
practical difficulties of ofsetting major disproportion between different 
sectors, regions and social classes within society and the need to achieve 
a degree of social, structural and spatial balance in the distribution of 
resources. 
The role of the state as planner can be analysed on other terms. 
In contrast with the wholly imperative or would-be imperative operations 
of the state as planner in the command economies, planning in the Western 
market economy since the war has typically been indicative, combined with 
mechanisms exhorting private capital to fulfil its potential growth rate 
in order both to raise profit expectations and the actual growth of the 
economy. 
Planners, like demand managers, were well aware of the significance 
for such expansion of the domestic economy on the balance of trade. However, 
in countries such as France, Italy and Britain they were especially concerned 
with problems of the structure of trade rather than simply its level in 
terms of demand management. They sougth to identify those sectors or areas 
of the economy with a high import propensity, and conversely those sectors 
where export potential was strong. This in turn involved them in questions 
of the structure of economic activity, and especially those sectors or 
forms which has a considerable influence on the rate of growth of the ecorony 
as a whole and the level of the trade balance. 
This preoccupation with the trade structure of the economy was related 
to the planners' concern with the social and spatial distribution of activity. 
*/ The views expressed in this work are the sole responsibility of the 
~~ author and do not necessarily coincide with those of the Organization. 
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In other words, national planners in countries such as France, Belgium 
Italy and Britain in the 1950s and 1960s were especially concerned with the 
generation of resources sufficient to enable an increasing expenditure in the 
social sectors of the economy and also either to offset increasing disparities 
in product,income and employment between different regions of the economy, or 
to undertake a convergence between those product, income and employment 
levels between different regional and urban areas. In the 1970s, as key 
urban areas have entered into economic crisis, there has been increased 
concern with urban and especially innercity policy in both the United States 
and Europe. As already indicated in earlier chapters, the relation between 
the social, sectoral and spatial distribution of resources depends not only 
on the role of the state within society but also upon the extent to which 
it is possible for any government to achieve a rise in the expectations and 
actual growth to match the potential growth of the economy as a whole. 
It cannot be claimed that the role of the state as planner has been 
uniformly sucessfui in those economies which have pursued medium-term 
economic plans. In part, this reflects the extent to which the assumption 
that the state could establish medium-term targets for ti»s sconcsny iiu s been 
questioned not only by politicians who in many cases have been reluctant to 
publish standards for failure or achievement in national expansion, but also 
by the degree to which the mechanisms of unequal competition between meso-
and microeconomic capital and national and multinational enterprise have 
qualified the feasibility of state p3_anning the level of individual nation 
states. 
This qualification does not imply that there is no role for the state 
as planner at the national level. Nonetheless it became increasingly clear 
to the planners themselves that unless there is an international and multi-
national dimension to their activities, the degree to which they will be 
able to offset the disproportion and imbalance analysed in chapters 23 to 25 
will be limited, frustrating both for planners and their plans. 
Part of the problem lay in the undermining of the Keynesian danand 
framework for planning policies by changes in the structure of supply. 
Predominantly small-scale national enterprise in the immediate postwar 
period had by the 1970s given way to the dominance of mesoeconomic multi-
national big bussiness in production, distribution and trade. Such new 
big bussiness (Gk: macros = large, micros = small, mesos = intermediate) 
profoundly qualified the effectiveness of indirect Keynesian measures such 
as fiscal and monetary policy, and exchange rate changes. In practice this 
amounted to a divorce of the Keynesian synthesis between macro demand 
management and micro supply structures. 
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Keynes plus planning 
By the early 1960s the convictiqn that it vas necessary to supplement 
Keynesian demand management policies also was gaining ground in Keynes's 
geographical and intellectual homeland. Britain's growth record in the 1950's 
had been uniformly lower than that of the continental Western European 
countries with the exception of Belgium, with recurrent payments dificits 
accompanying demand-induced expansion. Without doubt both Britain and 
Belgium were special cases. Both had entered the postwar period with higher 
per capita income lelvels that the other economies concerned, which for seme 
time could justifiable be said to have been catching-up on Britain and 
Belgium income levels. In addition, both countries were the pacemakers in 
the original indistrail revolution in Western Europe, and could be said to 
have suffered from over-specialisation in waht now had become traditional or 
declining industries. 
Besides, both Britain and Belgium had traditionally encouraged capital 
investment in colonies at the cost of direct investment at heme, while Britain 
in addition had accepted long-term debt obligations during the war which 
reduced the credibility of sterling as reserve currency, and aggravated 
pressure on the pound in the event of balance of payments deficits which 
other countries might have sustain«! in the short-term without pressure for 
domestic deflation. A further factor possible may have been a lower degree 
of labour supply than that available in the fast-growing continental Western 
European economies either from inter-regional or inter-sectoral migration. 
But there were additional problems for slow-growing economies such as 
Belgium and Britain which had already been outlined in Harrod's pioneering 
application of Keynesian analysis to economic growth. The emphasis in 
Harrod growth models is on the rate of savings and investment and the 
capital-output ratio of the investment concerned. For a given capital-
output ratio, more investment will mean higher growth. Through embodied 
technical progress the capital-output ratio also will be lowered, further 
increasing the rate of growth for a given savings and investment level. 
But both are important. In other words, while innovation will raise the 
growth potential of an economy, the flow of innovation itself depends upon 
the rate of investment. And this depends on entrepreneours' expectation of 
the likely rate of growth of demand for their products. In Harrod's terms 
the ''warranted" rate of the sense that it is held by them to warrant a given 
rate of investment in physical plant and equipment„ As Harrod pointed out 
in 1939, this may well be lower than growth potential of the economy as a 
whole - in Harrod terms the "natural" rate. 
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Yet under low actual growth conditions, it is not in private companies' 
interest to increase their rate of investments over and above what he anticipates 
as the warranted growth rate, since will leave them with surplus capacity, 
lowered profits and a reduced market quotation, endangering long-term survival. 
In other words, low growth tends to be self-reinforcing in the sense that when 
actual growth is low, private interest will act in such a way as to keep it low. 
Monetary and fiscal policy 
In principle this situation could be remedied by appropriate monetary 
and fiscal policies. Cheaper money and reduced taxation on intermediate and 
final products should raise entrepreneurs' expectation of the warranted growth 
rate and result in an increase in the overall rate of investment. But in 
practice, fiscal and monetary policies alone will not prove enough. 
First, they serve more than one purpose. While their potential might 
be maximised if they were directed solely towards the mobilisations of 
investment in given sectors, with differentiated interest rate concessions 
and tax rebates, they also have to serve their traditional Keynesian end of 
management of the macroeconcmic demand level, where short-term balance of 
payments difficulties reflecting a low rate of growth of long-term investment 
may necessitate deflationary monetary and fiscal policy vjhich furthez reinforces 
the lony-term low investment trend. 
Second, long-term investment takes considerable time from conception 
to production. A venture involving entirely now plant and equipment will 
take anything from two to five years for completion. The stimulation of 
dgnand by fiscal policy measures therefore may result in demand-pull inflationary 
pressure before long-term investment has resulted in production to satisfy 
the expanded demand. 
Third, a succession of stop-go cycles will have its own disincentive 
effect on demand induced long-term investment, since management will beccme 
aware that an expansionary phase may be followed by deflationary policies by 
the time that the new capacity frcm new investment is available. Monetary 
policy is not more likely to prove effective in stimulating an increase in 
the rate of investment under such conditions, granted that the reduction of 
the total cost of a given investment project through a reduced interest rate 
would constitute a negligible proportion of the direct and indirect cost to 
the firm concerned in the event of its not being able to utilise a high 
proportion of the capacity of the investment over the medium-term. 
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The case for planning 
In 1974 Harrod himself admitted such limitations for monetary and 
fiscal policy and allowed that "free enterprise economies need seme further 
weapon than monetary and fiscal policies if they are to function efficiently". 
The instrument which he endorsed amounted to the institution of indicative 
national planning already pioneered by the French, and attempted as a major 
policy measure in the British National Plan of the following year. As 
Harrod argued with reference to his own conceptual framework, such a plan 
should make a specific estimate of the "natural" growth potential of the 
economy and should spell out its implications sector by sector to the 
industries concerned through their respective economic development committees. 
Harrod admitted that it: 
"should consist of more than the mere presentation of growth 
rates to industries. The industries should be requested to 
comment and, if some of the parts of the plan assigned to thorn 
are not feasible, the planning body should do a new input-output 
analysis in the light of the new information and put forward a 
new plan well based in all its parts". 
In other words, according to Harrod, a sectorally disaggregated 
national plan should attempt to inform and be informed by companies in such 
a way that the warranted growth rate rises to meet the natural growth potential 
of the economy. 
French planning 
France for years was held as the paradigm for indicative planning in a 
market economy. Yet planning in postwar France started with special advantages. 
First, direct government intervention in the economy has been a long-
standing feature of the French state since Louis XIV and Colbert. It was 
largely accepted by the private sectors as in its own as well as the 
national interest. 
Second, planning was introduced by a thoroughly exceptional individual -
Jean Monnet - and in the exceptional circumstances of postwar reconstruction 
when private enterprises was particularly anxious to co-operate with a clear 
central initiative on co-ordinating recovery frcm the war. 
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Third, it was accompanied by a major reform of the administrative 
civil service, and the establishment of a new training school for top 
recruits to that service - the Ecole Nationale d1Administration - which 
from the beginning taught and largely gained acceptance for the new planning 
process. 
Fourth, French planning was not merely indicative. Its success 
achieved depended not simply on the statement of sectoral targets in the 
manner recommended by Harrod, but also on direct leverage on mesoeconcmic 
companies, combining 'sticks' (especially price controls) with 'carrots' 
(concessionary grants and aids). 
Fifth, the "feedback" effects of planning itself were considerable. 
In simple terms, when actual growth is high indicative planning is likely 
to prove more effective than when it is low inasmuch as the stated growth 
targets will appear more credible to private enterprises. 
But after the war - and in contrast with the anti planning claims of 
Hayek and Friedman and others the French economy rapidly achieved a GNP 
growth rate of over 4 per cent per annum, rising to over 5 per cent per 
annum in the 1960s. 
CciUàt; U-L ? 
So what is the balance of judgement on the French model of indicative 
planning? According to Vera Lutz, (Central Planning for thè Market Economy: 
An analysis of French theory and experience, Longmans, London 1969): "French 
planning never had worked m France - nor could have worked there or anywhere 
else - as a largely 'non-interventionist' form of integral central planning. 
It had always worked only as a partial and interventionist planning. As 
such it had been not dissimilar, if we disregard a special attachment to 
price controls and certainly specially French techniques of intervention, 
from that engaged in by other 'Western Countries'". (Lutz, ibid, p. 184). 
More brutally, Jacques Rueff compared the French planners with "the 
cocks who crowed and thought they brought on the dawn". 
However, in contrast with Lutz's claim, French planning neither was 
not sought to be wholly imperative. Andrew Shonfield has put the position 
well in claiming that part of its success lay in the extent to which it 
was "mare than indicative - less than imperative". (Andrew Shonfield, Modern 
Capitalism: the changing balance of public and private power. Oxford 
University Press, London, New york, Toronto, 1975, Part 2, Chapter 5: The 
Etatist Tradition: France). For many of the French - as in postwar Italy -
planning was seen as a social and political process by which both present 
and future problems - unresolved by the market mechanism - could be identified 
and at least offset, if not remedied. 
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Against Rueff's claim, most of those in leading roles in politics, 
trades unions, bussiness or government in France were aware that through the 
half-century the French economy had been gripped in a chronic Malthusianism. 
Output growth was low in France for several years before the first world 
war. But postwar recovery frcm 1918 was hesitant and uncertain. France 
only achieved its pre WW1 output level in 1929, after which it fell with 
the slump. It only recovered its 1929 level by 1939. By contrast, the 
1939 level of output - during the First French Plan - was re-achieved as 
early as 1948 and increased dawn after dawn thereafter at a compound GDP 
rate of growth of four per cent per annum through the fifties, rising to 
5.5 per cent per annum through the 1960s. 
This was a period which literally transformed France frcm a relatively 
underdeveloped pre-industrial system to a modern industrial economy. While 
labour markets were able to draw upon reserves frcm agriculture with a 
reduction of French working population in agriculture from a third to less 
than a tenth over a period of seme thirty years, such a transformation 
could not have been possible without the demand pull frcm new investment 
for labour as well as the migration push of those whose rising social 
expectations made them less willing than their forebears to take up jobs 
"on the farm". 
Warrant for planning 
Also the importance of the planning process in raising expectations of 
economic growth (aligning the "warranted" onto a higher natural or "potential" 
for the economy) should not be underestimated. The social psychology of 
the process is important. As the key Planning Commissioner for the 1960s, 
Pierre Masse, has put it, indicative plans tended to be self-implementing 
inasmuch as they revealed a consistentpattern of future demands and supplies 
to market participants. The fact that targets as published by the planners 
were either over or under-achieved in particular sectors was less important 
than the awareness of the main social and economic actors in the system 
that buyers and suppliers, competitors and colleagues all were assuming 
expansion itself. As the title of Masse's book itself The Pl/m or Anti-
Hazard (Pierre Masse, Le Plan ou L'Anti-Hazard) makes plain, risks were 
reduced by the collective social process of planning. 
A state loans policy to industry is more efficient than when growth is 
low, because management will be more confident of a market for its products. 
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Moreover, it will be penalised by not maintaining a high rate of investment 
since it otherwise would risk loss of market share to other firms. Therefore, 
less imperative measures need be undertaken to ensure that particular 
production or import bottlenecks are widened, and planners can concern 
themselves with triming the pattern and structure of growth rather than 
more herculean effort of promoting it in the first place. Granted the 
constrains on the power of co-ordination and initiative of given planning 
staff, the less there is to do the more effective it can be. 
If such success was seen on Left,, Right and Centre for the first four 
plans in France - up to 1965 - Why the reduced success from the mid-1960s? 
One reason was precisely the difficulty in gaining a social consensus with 
respect to employment, inflation and public spending targets. Another was 
the beginning of a conflict between prestige, high technology and military 
spending and the social objectives of the Plan itself. When at the end of 
1965 the fifth French Plan (for 1966-1970) was being discussed in parliament 
a leading official of the Plan advised that one should not be too impressed 
by its objectives for housing, health, social expenditure, employment and 
income. In his words, it was inconceivable that France could undertake these 
social and economic aims within thé Plan while also allocating resources 
to an independent nuclear deterrent (L'Arme Mucleare) a supersonic aircraft 
and rocket delivery system (Force de Frappe and the Diamant programme) a 
related major computer system at a time when i-he United States would net 
allow France the use of major IBM systems (Plan Calcul) as well as high-prestige 
technology projects such as Concorde and a civil nuclear energy programme. 
As the official put it "this circle cannot be squared. I anticipate grave 
social tensions" *J 
The grave social tensions hit the streets of Paris two-and-a-half 
years later in May 1968. Relating in large part to a failure to resolve 
raised expectations within French society, the "events of May" can be seen 
not only as a rejection by a new breed of technocrats of the technocratic 
roles assigned for them in a paternalist society, but also -in part- as 
the result of the success rather than failure of the new plahnning process 
which had given such a degree of coherence to sustained economic expansion 
since the war. In other words, rather than Rueff's cocks crowing and 
causing the dawn, the very success of planning within the system raised 
political expectations especially at the level of the presidency of a very 
powerful President of a Republic -De Gaulle- that "the chicken could lay 
golden eggs". 
*/ Jean Saingeour, interview with the author, December 1965. 
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It certainly is clear that social tensions and the need to meet 
frustrated expectations in terms of housing, health and education systans 
became a priority for the Plan from the late 1960s onwards. However, the 
wages settlements of Grenelle by which De Gaulle in the Autunm of 1968 
isolated the students revolt by settling with the trades unions, largely 
pre-anpted the resources available for increased social expenditure. 
Planning in question 
Thus in early 1960s, just when it was exported abroad, French 
planning declined in effectiveness in France. In the words of Jacques 
Delors, this was "because the French were thinking of other things, because 
they were seized by the throat by inflation and were in major balance of 
payments deficit. At that stage, the Plan was not even debated by parliament. 
For planners, it was the crossing of a desert. During this period they 
turned their attentions to improving their techniques while waiting for 
better days". (Jacques Delors, "The Decline of French Planning' in Stuart 
Holland (ed.) Beyond Capitalist Planning, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1978). 
In these respects, the failure to involve the trades unions in a 
planning process which went beyond the traditional wage bargain, and the 
challenge by social and class forces to the resources claimed by the Plan, 
threw planning into question. 
International pressures 
As Delors stresses, in France the opening abroad and the increased 
internationalisation of the French economy related both to the decision to 
join the Common Market of the European Economic Community, and the greater 
emphasis given to market forces in general rather than to planning. Both 
factors were accompanied by "reforms". But these involved a paradox. The 
reforms proposed for planning entailed changes that weakened planning itself. 
For one thing, the indirect reliance on the market mechanism reduced the 
direct decision-making of the planners, and restricted them increasingly 
pursued outside the planning framework. The key macroeonomic variables on 
the budget, prices and credit no longer were integrated into the planning 
process. 
The result in France, Delors argued, was a period of exacerbated 
social tension. After a period of relative calm , the explosion of May 1968 
revealed the contradiction between a private liberal mode of development 
and the increasing social needs of the system. There was a class struggle. 
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But it had three main dimensions - the struggle for the redistribution of 
income, for better conditions of work and for the exercise of economic 
power. If there had been this alone, the government might have coped. 
However, in Delors words: "there was another dimensions within the first. 
This was the contradiction between the new ruling class that controlled big 
business and the traditional middle classes of farmers, shop keepers and 
snail firms. The government and conservative power had need of the first 
to assure both their policies and their economic prosperity. But they had 
an absolute need of the latter in order simply to stay in power via the 
vote... This was their cruel dilemma,trying to reconcile the traditional 
middle class with the view of industrialisation as perceived by the 
technostructure and the new ruling class. The Plan was not a good means 
for them to do this since it meant transparency and coherence in objectives. 
But the dilensma could not be solved either through clandestine incoherence. 
Hie failure to resolve it resulted in aggravated inflation." (Jacques Delors, 
ibid, pp. 22-23). 
The mesoeconomlc sector 
In France the mesoeconcmic sector had consciously been sought by 
policy makers in successive plans, however unconscious they may have been 
either of the concept itself, or its consequences for economic policy= - - — 
under the philosophy of big is better in international competition, and 
through awareness that government departments can only handle a small 
number of companies effectively through direct negotiation, the planners 
had sought to establish what they called the 80:20 ratio, whereby 80 per 
cent of given markets would be commanded by 2- per cent of enterprise in 
them. The state as planner sought to promote margers. 
However/as Delors has indicated, they found themselves faced with 
the question of who controls real resource allocation and who gains from 
planning. As French planning moved beyond the recovery phase, reliance on 
purely indicative measures in the private sector was found wanting. Planning 
targets had to be accompanied by a range of "sweeteners" such as government 
contracts, fiscal concessions, subsidised interest rates and outright grants 
as incentives to persuade leading firms to undertake what the public sector 
could be obliged to do through more imperative power. The formula of French 
planning as "imperative for the public sector and indicative for the private" 
- enshined as late as 1976 by President Giscard D'Estaing as in large part 
a fig veiling massive public subsidy of the private sector. Through its 
apologist such as Masse, French planning was seen as coordinations of 
private enteprise in the public interest. But in practice it could well 
be seen as public coordination of the private interest, on public funds, 
for what the private sector largely chose to do in the first place. With 
so few firms the state had few alternatives. 
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A qualification of the argument could be made in principle in the case 
of price controls. But general price controls can suit big business in the 
mesoeconcmic sector to the extent that it is concerned to increase its 
monopolistic domination of particular national markets. When productivity 
through gains frcrn size and larger scale innovation is lower in big than 
small business, general price controls squeeze the profits of small firms 
harder than big ones. Thus state price controls used as a planning 
instrument, either for reasons of international competitiveness or also as 
part of a contract between the state and organized labour can actually 
operate as a powerful instrument for the concentration and centralisation 
of capital. 
Once concentration and the monopoly trend has proceeded apace, as was 
the case in France by the mid 1960s, capital in the mesoeconcmic sector 
pressured for less price control, and greater market freedom. It gained 
this - safe frcm public view - in the committee roans of the Finance and 
Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Finance. One result, even before the 
ccmmodoty and oil price increases of the early seventies, was major 
inflationary pressures 
In short, the planners who sought to promote a big business in France 
were fairly godmothers rather than parents to the concentration of capital: 
they sponsored, favoured and aided a process occuring essentially through 
the market mechanism. The adolescent European firms sponsored by the planners 
grew to a dominance in the economy which raised a real question on who planned 
whom - the planners the companies, or the companies the plan. 
Crisis and decline 
If the sixth Plan (1970-75) no more foresaw the oil price increases from 
1973 than had leading economic authorities in other countries. The degree of 
relative certainty about the broad direction of the economy which had been 
apparent and successful between the late 1940s and May 1968 now was thrown 
into fundamental question. The relative sophistication of the Monnet-Masse 
planning process, with its modernisation sectoral committees, its increasingly 
sophisticated econometric models and its more detailed future forecast lost 
credibility among both civil servants and businessmen because of the increasingly 
uncertain world environment. The oil price increases frcm 1973 hit France 
especially hard as a nation 85 per cent dependent on imported energy for its 
domestic economy. 
As well put by Saul Estrin and Peter Holmes (French Planning in Theory 
and Practice, George Allen and Urwin, London 1983), the seventh Plan (1975-80) 
came increasingly to be seen as a government public relations exercise. 
By 1975, as other leading world economies put on the brakes rather than 
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adjusted the steering following the OPEC increases, high unemployment 
hit France for the first time since the war. The seventh Plan stated that 
a return to full employment was major objective of the Plan. In contrast 
with the earlier postwar plans, however, it failed to spell out how this 
could be achievedf while the government actually tried to obscure calculations 
by the planners who realised that this objective could not be met on the 
relatively deflationary policies being pursued by the government itself. 
It was at this time that the Keynesian paradigm which had prevalied in 
relation to macroeconomic policy in France throughout the postwar period 
was increasingly being challended by monetarists and those who both wished 
to "roll back the frontiers of the state" and give priority to market forces. 
In 1980, with the publication of the Eighth and subsequent national 
plans, it was clear that the pre-socialist French government found itself 
in considerable difficulties in ensuring either the basic generation of 
resources at the macroeconcmic level, or a sufficient scale of sectoral 
and social redistribution to offset the tensions created by unemployment 
in traditional industries such as word processing and data processing in 
the service sector headed by Simon Nora (The Nora Report). The Nora and 
Mine report anticipated not only grave social tensions from the rundown 
in industrial employment through modernisation, but also from the introduction 
of word data processors in the service sector of the economy, which it 
anticipated could result in the unemployment of nine out of ten of the 
existing labour force wxliiin twenty or thirty years. While the French 
economy had been able to sustain the process of industrialisation in the 
third century following the Second World War by attracting the offspring 
of peasants and farmers into industry and service, the warning registered 
by Nora did not pass without notice either in France or broad. 
The international context 
It is arguable that the lack of economic sovereignty shown in the 
British case lay fundamentally in the limited power of indicative planning 
and incentives to harness the multinational companies which by then dominated 
half of Britain trade output. Italy and France, being less multinational 
did not face the same problem, or suffer it in the same scale. Jean Benard 
and Bela Balassa have claimed that EEC membership undermined the basis of 
the key planning levels of the Fourth Republic period in France - in particular 
the threat that tariffs would be reduced if leading a firm would not comply 
With the planners' interpretation of the public interest. But it is not clear 
that the planners were exerting a leverage so powerful by this means as to 
justify the conclusion that EEC entry gelded the planners' powers. The 
increased bargaining power of the few firms which by the 1960s had come to 
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dominate particular sectors of the economy probably also was important. By 
then, reconstructed big business in France had ccme to challenge the State's 
mediation between the public and private interest. 
A key argument is that the increasing liberalisation of trade and 
payments in the Western world economy as a whole from the late 1950s was 
important in eroding the bargaining power of the State in relation to meso-
econcmic capital. On the tariff side, the Kennedy Found was to reduce the 
caimon external tariff of the EEC on industrial products to a negligible 
6 per cent average. EEC internal tariff abolition only just preceded the 
US achievonent of virtual entire liberalisation of trade. The rise of the 
Eurodollar market preceded EEC monetary union with the establishment of an 
effective Eurcmoney to which most big business in most countries had free 
and easy access. The decline of the role of the FDES (Fund of Economic and 
Social Development) in France and the KFW (Reconstruction Loans Corporation) 
in Germany as lenders to big business appear partly to have accompanied this 
trend. 
Fiscal crisis 
The real change in favour of capital and against governments in the 
sixties took the form of increased concern by planners and public authorities 
to ensure international competitiveness through export promotion under the new 
liberalisation conditions. In Britain the normal rates of corporation tax 
by the end of 1960s had virtually been offset entirely by an increased scale 
and range of government rebates, allowances and investment grants to industry. 
Since the export trade sector represented the manufacturing industries which 
transformed basic materials and power inputs into foods for service distribution, 
the represented in practice a failure to tax the productive sector of the 
economy effectively. Again, in France, much of the public hand-back to the 
private sector appears to have occurred in the silence of the corridors of the 
Ministry of Finance, and to be less liable to precise evaluation. But in 
any case, taxation in France had tended to be more regressive and less weighted 
on the corporate sector than in Britain. In Italy, there has always been some 
truth in the otherwise entertaining judgement than big business paid little 
to no tax anyway, keeping one set of books for the government and another for 
itself. 
To the extent that multinational capital was exerting an increasing 
influence in Western Europe, the technique of transfer pricing put big business 
operating in more than one country in a position to increase the nominal cost 
of imports from subsidiaries abroad in such a way as to minimise profits in 
any one country or group of countries where nominal taxation was high, with 
the funds concerned frequently being "laundered" through tax havens. As a 
result, there was an increasing tendency with the multinational trend for 
those mesoeconcmic companies which could afford most tax to pay the least 
or none at all. 
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Inflation and planning 
Granted that big business in the mesoeconcmic sector by the late 1960s 
had ccme to represent sane third of economic activity in the main economies 
of Western Europe (e.g. in EEC in 1981 one third GDP was represented by only 
140 ccmpannies), this decline in effective taxation poed a fiscal crisis for 
states which had more to assume that thay could finance continually rising 
public expenditure without difficulty. In other words, the fiscal basis of 
the "Keynesian State" was substantially undermined. 
Increasingly, public expenditure was financed by borrowing rather than 
taxation from the productive sectors of the economy. The borrowing costs were 
increasingly met by regressive taxation on wage and salary earners, who responded 
to the threat to their rising real incomes by increased demands for higher 
nominal inccme. Higher wage costs in turn provided private capital with the 
case to claim that it could afford to support State policies for restraint 
of prices. Commodity price inflation (in many cases representing the transfer 
pricing by vertically integrated multinationals) underlay the oil price inflation 
from 1973 which only turned and re-turned the screw of an already major 
inflationary spiral. 
Inflation of the kind experienced before the post 1973 oil price rises 
could have been tolerated for seme time, not only because it still was generally 
within single figures, and because it was accompanicd by sustained growth of 
income at relatively full employment in most of the advanced capitalist countries 
in Europe. But the combination of inflation and recession from 1973 onwards 
exposed the Keynesian planners to the crisis in accumulation of capital and 
real inccme and profit growth. 
According to the orthodoxies which gained acceptance in the 1960s, 
relatively high levels of unemployment would ensure that wage demands were 
restrained, basically through reducing trades union bargaining power. This 
Paish-Phillips argument was burst asunder from the mid 1960s in Britain. 
In Italy, the combination after two decades of separate action of the three 
main engineering unions showed that the thesis relied too much on a retrospective 
reading of the tranquillity of labour during the long postwar boom, with the 
hot Autumm of 1968 reversing profit-wage imbalance and threatening further 
capital accumulation on a major scale under private control. 
However, one factor in the combination of inflation and recession in 
the early and mid 1970s in Western Europe appears to have lain in the hitherto 
unfelt consequences of the trend to monopoly and mesoeconcmic power in the 
heartland of the system. Basically, in the earlier and more competitive period 
of capitalism, prices tended to lead output and employment in the upturn and 
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downturn of the trade cycle. In the upturn, capitalists expected rightly that 
they could command higher prices during a period of rising relative scarcity 
of inputs and final goods (when receipts and incomes were high). In tihe downturn, 
inversely, they sought to gain a larger share of declining markets through 
lowering prices faster than the fall in activity. 
Capitalist planning 
The previous argument suggests that: 
1) modern capitalist planning was only in part responsible for the basic 
accumulation of capital which occurred in Western Europe after the war; 
2) Keynesian demand management provided a rationale for the process of 
combined public expenditures and private capital accumulation which occurred 
in the Western European economies, rather than its cause; 
3) indicative planning established its postwar reputation during the 
period of which it in fact was mainly affecting the publics sector spending 
and enterprise; 
4) the liberalisation of trade compounded rather than caused the 
increasing imbalance between the economic power of mesoeconcmic big business 
and government planners; 
5) the leading planners increasingly sought to go beyond macro or 
sectoral planning to industrial mesoeconcmic companies, through voluntary 
or indicative agreements; 
6) such agreements lacked sufficient 'pull' on mesoeconcmic companies 
to match the 'push' from public spending and public enterprise planning. 
New ends and means 
If a democratic society is to ensure the classic welfare ends of full 
employment, equitable distribution of income, and extensive social services, 
it must achieve a strategic control over the allocation of resources, it also 
must ensure that planning means both new ends or objectives, and new institutional 
means for their achievement. This involves a new framework for reasoning about 
the role of the economy in society, rather than simply trying - vainly - to 
make the prevailing system work at higher levels of output and employment. 
Further it means planning as a process of social negotiation for new ends.-for 
econcndc needs and development - as the means to democratic allocation of 
resources in the public interest. 
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New ends and means for planning - as a process of negotiation and 
debate- means extending the democratic process into the centre of planning 
itself. It should mean an extension of parliamentary debate, on democratic 
principles, beyond the mere scrutiny of five year plans elaborated by technical 
experts and civil servants. If the means of democratic negotiation and debate 
through society are to prove effective they will require a new mix in the 
at present unequally mixed economies, and an extension of new forms of public 
and cooperative enterprices through which the public can directly undertake 
what private enterprise either cannot ot will not fulfil. If this is not to 
result in excessive centralisation of State power, the role of government 
should be limited to strategic intervention, rather than covering every process 
of resource allocation. 
Hitherto, faced with crisis , governments have reacted defensively, 
adopting a range of tactics assumed to cover its position until the ítiárket 
mechanism ensures a recovery of the system. This reaction, whether by cautious 
Keynesianism or manic monetarism offers no solution to the crisis. The State 
itself must become a protagonist of the new model of development, concerning 
itself more with the means and ends of a new social and economic ordéir and less 
with means alone designed to defend or restore the already outdated system 
of the past. 
Beyond indicative planning 
Much of the State intervention of the past has been called planning. 
But the plans concerned have been secondary rather than primary; passive rather 
than active, and on paper rather than in the field of real politics. The State 
was invoked to set targets which it could not fulfil, since it lacked Command 
over strategic sectors and groups within the economy. It was called on to 
salvage groups failing enterprise, to offset unemployment, inflation and the 
rising public deficit without either a strategy for the future or means for 
its realisation. 
In one sense, lacking a framework for planning as a process of social 
negotiation for changed options in the system, the State could not even simulate 
a working model of the future. It also lacked the social relations of consent 
- necessary to achieve such a scenario of the future. Presuming too much 
knowledge within the system, it relied on changing the shape of the econcny 
mainly through aggregate macreconamic policies, leaving a framework of incentives 
to induce the mesoeconcmic and microeconcamic sectors to follow the targets 
of the plan. 
Structural relationships within the system, and especially the issue 
of transfers of productivity between those in work and those unemployed or in 
retirement, were largely ignored or postponed. 
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Visible versus invisible hands 
One of the most apparent features of the current crisis is the failure 
of the invisible hand of the market lauded by its main apologists including 
Freidman. But planning, on the other hand, must both make visible its hand 
and do so throughout the range of complex mechanism by which power can be 
decentralised through the market and associate sectors. Not least, the visible 
hand of the State must be controlled by society through new forms of represent-
ative mechanisms of it is to be democratic and socialist rather than bureaucratic 
or state capitalist. 
If the new model of development is to be planned, it implies overall 
systematic planning and also planning within a new system of social negotiation 
for change. Such planning also must move beyond the traditional formulations 
of indicative versus imperative. 
Systematic planning seeks to include its framework of analysis and 
evaluation all those variables considered to be relevant to the planning process 
and articulates individual plans and aspirations within an overall consistent 
framework. For the instruments of democratic planning are plans - in the plural 
while the validity of planning is to give coherence to individual aspirations 
which otherwise, through the working of the market, are either incoherent or 
unachieved. The planning process also must provide a means by which sectoral, 
social ans spatial (regional-urban) plans can be reconciled within a given 
national framework. 
Planning and bargaining 
To be effective, plans must be implemented. On the other hand, it is 
clear that there will be conflicting interests in the planning process. To 
achieve coherence of the kind which cannot new be achieved by the market, the 
process of planning must in itself involve a trade-off between different social 
groups and classes. 
In fact, such a process of trade-off and bargaining would amount in a 
real sense to a re-introduction of the process of pluralism to the modern 
economy. For in reality, we no longer live today in a market system. The 
contemporary capitalist economy is dominated by a few, powerful interest groups, 
concentrated in the priviliged relationship between big business and the State. 
This 'administered' market was recognised in previous form by Galbraith under 
the title of 'the planning system*. But in reality the big business component 
in this system cannot plan, both because of the crisis of accumulation and 
sales, and precisely because both government and unions have been 'bargain' 
but without a strategic planning framework. 
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Planning and the unions 
It also is clear that the new dimension to planning made possible in a 
new model of development implies major change for trades unions. If trades 
unions choose to stay mainly within the framework of traditional collective 
bargaining on wages and working conditions, they either will not be willing 
or not able to take part in the new planning process and the overall allocation 
of resources in society. Clearly this implies a new challenge and new 
responsibility for unions. Many unions fear incorporation into the system 
by taking part in such new planning procedures. But, on the other hand, 
unions cannot avoid crisis and its consequences by standing outside the new 
bargaining process. By so doing they will be observers and victims rather 
than actors and gainers. Without than the new planning would not be democratic 
nor would it be likely to shift resources in favour of working people. 
Planning and consumers 
A new planning system needs not only bargaining by producers but also 
by consumers. To date, the mass production and consumption systun has relegated 
the consumer movement and its pressure groups to the role of protest about 
the quality of products, rather than their price, the market which they serve 
or their role in the allocation of resources. In this sense the consumer is 
the victim rather than victor of the present system. The contrast is not only 
between consumer and producer sovereignty, but also between the myth of the 
market and the inability of the consumer to control the goods and services 
which the market allegedly serves. 
In a process of systematic and democratic planning, the State no longer 
should pretend to represent the consumer. To countervail the present forces, 
a transformation of the role of the consumer is imperative. In effect this 
means a new and enlarged role for the consumer in the bargaining process on 
the use of resources in society:i.e. within the process of democratic planning. 
Planning-by-agreenen t 
New dimensions have been added to the possibility of effective planning 
in the big business sector by the emergence of parallel or convergent policies 
in same of the key parties of the European Left, and trades unions in Australia 
and the United States. 
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Planning agreements have been official Labour Party policy since 1973. 
A similar policy was stated in the Projet Socialiste of the French Socialist 
Party to be 'the main plank' of its industrial policy, and in June 1982 the 
French government introduced Contrats de Plan, covering both the public sector 
and private forms receiving significant state aid. The Flemish Socialist 
Party in Belgium has been giving serious consideration to the adoption of 
Accords de Planification. The Australian trades unions, in association with 
Labour administrations in State government, has been pursuing the same policy. 
PASOK in Greece is joining this trend with a policy of the same name, as 
declared by the Prime Minister in September 1982. 
In Italy, a policy similar to that of planning agreements was pursued 
under the Centre Left government from the late 1960s under the name of 
Programme Contracts (Contrattazione Programmata). Planning agreements also 
have recently been re-introduced for major investment projects in the South. 
In Belgium legislation for such Programme contract (Contrat de Programme) was 
introduced in legislation in 1971 when the Socialists participated in government 
and under their pressure. In Portugal legislation was introduced by the 
Socialist government for a Programme Contract type policy. 
Internationally, some leading trades unions, such as the International 
Metalworkers Federation, have recently recommended the introduction of Planning 
Agreement negotiations (The Global Programme for Jobs, International Metalworkers 
Federation, Rome 10-11 June 1982). 
It has to be stressed that previous policies of bi-lateral contractual 
planning between government and business alone have not been uniformly successful. 
In some cases they have been clearly unsuccessful, and have not succeeded in 
a major change in the balance of public and private power, However, a key 
element in those policies has been voluntary nature of the agreements. Belgian 
planners in the early 1970s were well aware that agreements which théy negotiated 
with companies such as Siemens and Phillips ran the risk of proving public 
relations exercises with the companies concerned which could appear to be 
cooperating with the public interest while in fact being iriinimally influenced 
by their activity. 
It also is arguable, however, that the bi-lateral planning approach so far has 
been limited not only because it was open to involvement by trades unions 
but also because it was not given a central role in the planning process. By and 
large it was undertaken still within a sectoral or micreconamic framgwork. It thus 
tended to respond to problems at the level of individual firms and industries. 
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Planning potential 
If a Planning Agreement approach is to realise its potential it roust 
conciously aim to relate macroeconomic targets and policies with change in 
the behaviour of mesoeconomic big business. Conventional macroeconamic policy 
has not been misplaced in its aim of changing, aggregate performance, but in 
the means which it has adopted. The lenghthened planning cycle of big business 
with larger scale and technically more advanced projects now spans as long or 
longer than most governments, and certainly longer than individual budgets. 
Similarly, national policies for the macroeconorny are profoundly. influenced 
both by the international environment and the global range of multinational 
companies. 
In this sense no policy of planning for change.can be effective without 
a reflationary macroeconomic policy. Planning Agreements at the level of 
individual firms can complement but not substitute for macroeconomic policy. 
It also has been stressed that the rise of multinational big business 
now has divorced both the Keynesian and monetarist macro-micro synthesis. 
Therefore planning—by—agreement at the big business level must relate 
to the macroeconomic variables including: 
Prices, productivity and profits (rate of return) 
Output 
Employment 
Trade (including trade tax subsidiaries) 
Investment 
Consumption 
Such policy within a Planning Agreement framework also should be able 
to take account of three main aspects of distribution which have been elaborated 
in Part 2: 
* Structural ( between sectors and firms) 
* Social (between economic groups and social classes) 
* Spatial (between regions ans urban areas) 
Accounting and accountability 
If this appears ambitious, account should be taken of the small number 
of firms which now donimate the macroeconcmy in any European country. Only 
140 companies already command one-third of the GDP of the European Ccrtttttunity. 
In practice between 100 and 150 companies in a typical European economy tend to 
represent half or more of the main sectors of activity. What they do at the 
structural level dominates not only macroeconomic aggregates but also dominates 
the social and spatial distribution of activity. In turn, as recognised for 
decades through standar oligopoly theory, leading firms in the system dominate 
the microeconcmic sector fo smaller national, regional and local firms. 
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Technically, there are major gains frcm introducing a mesoeccnomic 
dimension to both national and international accounting. It is because 
leading enterprise now is so multinational that national figures for concen-
tration are so related to international concentration (e.g. the 140 companies 
now accounting for a third of EEC gross domestic product), introducing an 
obligation on leading firms to submit both actual activity and intend®! policy 
in terms of standard accounting categories could transform the present opaque 
future through a new transparency. Thus information on the intended activity 
of a few dozen firms could give a government the basis for transforming macro 
performance through the mesoeconcmic sector. 
Such a data base frcm very few firms could easily be related to input-
output techniques. Data could be collated on the basis of one or a combination 
of three main criteria: i) four firms concentration ratios; ii) those firms 
representing the upper half of the sector or, iii) firms with more than a given 
turnover per annum. Firms also could be required to submit further information 
within the context of a specific Planning Agreement. This is no more than the 
range of data required in Belgium under the Programme Contracts procedure, but 
more systematic and more related to both macro and microeconomic structures. 
The links between the mesoeconcmic and microeconcmic sectors could be 
traced through the information gained frcm leading firms in the Planning Agreement 
sector. This is the significance of the information on 'buyers and suppliers' 
which should be required from leading firms. Information on social distribution 
(by wage, skill, sex) is in principle not difficult to achieve. Spatial distri-
bution of the investment and employment of subsidiaries and plant of mesoecancamic 
enterprise can contribute to establishing a socio-spatial 'map' of the dominant 
enterprises in the system. 
Public and private power 
Technical progress and new technologies such as word and data processors 
and robotics imply considerable net unemployment of a private model of capitalist 
growth is projected into the future. Moreover, such growth will be only partial 
and unequal in its distribution; it will benefit only certain social groups and 
classes, and limited regions and areas. 
As already stressed, if a New Model of Development is to displace monetarism 
on the European agenda, it imply a major shift from private "to social consumption. 
The productivity fram new technologies will need to be re-distributed in the 
three main senses already described, i.g. i) structurally -between firms and 
sectors-; ii) socially -between different groups and classes, and iii) spatially 
-between different areas and regions. 
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Macroeconcmic fiscal policy clearly will have a key continuing role to 
play in this process. But the main beneficiaries from the new technologies will 
be the leading firms in the mesoeconcmic sector (either directly since their 
scale alone can justify the investment expenditures involved, or indirectly 
through gains from raised productivity in supplying firms). New forms of taxation 
will need to be considered in relation to big business to avoid under-statement 
of profits through transfer pricing. Such tax liability can only be effective 
if negotiated directly with the individual companies through a Planning Agreement 
type of procedure. Such a policy implies constraints on the big business sector 
and sanctions employed by governments for non-cooperation or blatant disregard 
for the public interest. 
If by these means the State were to advance beyond indicative planning, 
it should reserve the right that no mescconomic enterprise should receive either 
i) public contracts; ii ) public aid, or iii) qualification of general price 
controls unless it negotiated a Planning Agresnent. Clearly these three factors 
of public spending, public subsidy and price controls are potentially powerful 
caribinations of incentives and constraints on the big league private sector ° 
A counterpart part ot the above constraints is the planning through and 
extension of the public sector. Clearly this varies on the European Left between 
major commitments to extension from the Socialist Party in France to caranitment 
to democratise the public sector already there ( in the case of PCI in Italy). 
Broadly, extension of the public enterprise sector can be seen as a direct measure-
'pushing' investment, employment, location, etc. against the indirect 'pull® 
effect of Planning Agreement policies on the private big business sector. 
The recent French experience of bringing leading firms into public 
ownership under the socialist government should not be seen as a refutation 
of this potential. Deflationary measures introduced by the government in response 
to international speculative pressure against the franc nonetheless exempted 
key investment modernisation programmes and more than half of this investment 
increase was undertaken by existing and new public enterprise groups over a 
period of five years. 
Thus, in the heartland of the Western European economies there are new 
dimensions for reconciling effective strategic planning with a high degree of 
evolution of tactical decision making in enterprise. This process should 
involve joint negotiation, through Planning Agreements between representatives 
of governomnt, unions and managements (whether that management remains conventional 
or is worker-elected). Such a tri-partite formula makes feasible a reconciliation 
of the public interest of society as a whole with the economic interest of viable 
enterprise in the sector. 
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Joint negotiation 
Joint negotiation offers the potential for three major dimensions for 
democratic planning: 
i) a fundamental change in the balance of power in big business from 
capital towards labour and government; 
ii) a framework for the reconciliation of the otherwise potentially 
conflicting interests of producers in big business versus producers and consumers 
in general; and 
iii) a framework in which such strategic negotiation avoids both over-
centralised planning of the command economies and ineffective merely indicative 
planning models. 
In addition, it makes possible a higher degree of worker self-management 
and control in the vast majority of small and medium enterprises in the system. 
Basically, Yugoslav decentralisation and workers' control has resulted in a trend 
to insufficent strategic national planning, with persistent regional imbalance 
price inflation and balance of payments problems. But joint negotiation of 
planning ends ard meanss in the big business sector and through democratic 
institutions could leave some 99 per cent of enterprise free within general 
guidelines to undertake their own allocation of resources without direct central 
intervention i n specific cases. 
If such democratic planning is to prove effective in mobilising economic 
resources in the public interst it will need a framework for the process of 
planning as social negotiation. If we are to avoid authoritarian or technocratic 
planning imposed from above, it also must transform the previous rigid five 
year planning framework which had predominated in both East and West Europe. 
On the one hand, such a framework is too long to permit effective change in 
planning ends and means. Parliaments thus only have a chance twice a decade 
to comments on plans after they have already been formulated in detail in the 
seclusion of finance, industry and planning departments. Yet such five year 
plans do not take a long enough time horizon to prospect changes in the overall 
structure of the economy and society. As a result, their frameworks tends to 
reinforce pseudo-planning as an exhortation to make the prevailing system work 
at higher levels of output. 
Alternative plans 
Recognition of the new dominance of big business power in the contemporary 
economy provides the basis for a democratic planning framework. Such big 
league enterprises, with fev exceptions, employ an internal five year planning 
horizon. Such firms tend to employ technology and innovation perspectives of 
up to ten years or more, while they actually adapt their investment plans on an 
annual or less than annual basis. In this way their corporate planning, on 
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private criteria, amounts to a rolling, on-going five yeaf plan which is 
annually adaptable, with a longer forecasting and technology perspectives. 
Facilities and funds should increasingly be made available to trades 
unios to propose and develop alternative corporate plans with different 
options and criteria from those of the private sector. The feasibility 
of such alternative plans has been demonstrated in several companies, including 
most notably in Lucas Aerospace Combine Committee's proposals for a range of 
products in the 'life industry' of health, safety and transport, as against 
the 'deaht industry' of defense. 
Private corporate planning in the big league should be transformed 
under such a process of democratic planning. Big business normally takes a 
review of the previous years' results in the spring of any year, and a preview 
each year (frequently in the autumm) of the coming year's prospects. Such 
bi-annual adaptability could be socialised through the tripartite principle 
of involving both the public authorities and the unions in negotiation of 
change in corporate planning in the mesoeconcmic sector on a similar time 
schedule -spring and autumn each year. This is perfectly feasible in a situation 
where only a few dozen enterprises in the main Western European economies 
account for some half of national investment, output and trade. 
Similarly, there is no reason why parliaments should not be involved 
in national debate twice a year on the results of a tripartite negotiations 
in the mesoeconcmic public and private sectors. Such a on-going process of 
negotiated planning would place parliamentarians in an informed position 
from which to pressure for further change on the aims and methods of planning 
itself. 


